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INTRODUCTION
Developments in information and communicationtechnologies have transformed the way thatlawyers work. Nowadays, the electronic resources
are so swift, comprehensive and convenient that
researching the law only occasionally involves consulting
the hard copy sources in the library. Imagine, though, that
further developments of this kind, coupled with
developments in biotechnologies and nanotechnologies, as
well as in human brain/machine interfacing, reach a stage
at which all legal source materials are on a tiny chip
connected to the human brain. With such enabling
technology, the lawyers of the future will be more than
advanced, they will be enhanced. Should we welcome
enhancing developments of this kind? Should we try to
resist them or confine them? How should regulators
respond? What kind of regulatory environment should be
set for a community of potentially enhanced citizens,
lawyers, and law-enforcers? 
In Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution
(2008), I identified three challenges that nation states face
as they endeavour to put in place the right kind of
regulatory environment for the development, application
and exploitation of emerging technologies, an environment
properly geared for risk management, for liability and
compensation, for incentivisation, and for benefit sharing.
These are the challenges of, respectively, regulatory
legitimacy, regulatory effectiveness, and regulatory
connection. On this analysis, regulators are liable to be
called to account if the purposes or objectives that they are
pursuing (or, the manner and means by which they pursue
those objectives) are judged to be illegitimate; or if their
interventions are ineffective and not fully fit for purpose;
or if they have failed to make a timely, targeted and
sustainable regulatory connection. In this short article,




Where human enhancement is simply cheating by
another name, we should obviously take a negative view.
However, if the rules permit enhancement, or if the
situation is not competitive, is a negative view still
appropriate? If regulators permit (even encourage)
physical and intellectual improvement, why prohibit
technologies for human enhancement? Does it make sense,
for example, to argue that regulators should permit the
application of technologies to correct impairment (such as
failing eyesight) but not to enhance human capacities (for
example, to equip a person with X-ray or all-round vision)?
How do we sort out the ethical wheat from the chaff?
What is the appropriate standard of regulatory legitimacy?
Broadly speaking, ethical argument adopts one of three
basic forms: namely, goal-orientated (consequentialism),
rights-based and duty-based forms. Each form is a mould
or a shell, open to substantive articulation in many
different ways: different goals, different rights, and
different duties may be specified. Nevertheless, in
principle, the basic pattern of ethical debate, whatever the
particular technological focus – whether it be
biotechnology (and bioethics), ICT (and cyberethics),
nanotechnology (and nanoethics), or neurotechnology
(and neuroethics) – is governed by this matrix.
Accordingly, when the questions concern human
enhancement, with a variety of technological interventions
being mooted, it is the ethics of consequentialism, the
ethics of rights, and the ethics of duties that we can expect
to be pleaded. More particularly, it is the ethics of
utilitarian consequentialism, of human rights, and of
dignitarian duty that will be pleaded because, in this
context, these are the principal substantive articulations of
the basic matrix.
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In general, unless there are major safety concerns,
utilitarians will assert the “green light” ethics of
proceeding, a case of promotion (of the technology)
modulated by a degree of precaution; human rights
theorists will take an “amber light” approach insisting that
the technological traffic pauses (to ensure rights, especially
informed consent, clearance) before proceeding; and
dignitarians will take a “red light” approach to those
technologies (or their applications) that they judge to
compromise human dignity.
Utilitarianism
For utilitarians, we do the right thing if we follow
whichever option seems to have the best prospects of
maximising welfare or minimising distress. Taking such a
utilitarian approach, John Harris (Enhancing Evolution,
2007) has argued that regulators should treat human
enhancement as permissible – enhancing measures being
understood as those which 
make us better at doing some of the things we want to do,
better at experiencing the world through all of the senses,
better at assimilating and processing what we experience,
better at remembering and understanding things, stronger,
more competent, more of everything we want to be. (at 2)
Indeed, provocatively, Harris has argued that “not only
are [such] enhancements permissible but…in some cases
there is a positive moral duty to enhance” (at 3).
Quite possibly, some utilitarians (applying the same
utilitarian criteria) might disagree. It has been suggested,
for example, that the blurring of the boundary between
man and machine might give rise to various feelings of
distress, disorientation, and even existential panic. And, in
the context of life-extension, Leon Kass (admittedly, no
utilitarian) has remarked:
Even the most cursory examination of these matters suggests
that the cumulative results of aggregated decisions for longer
and more vigorous life could be highly disruptive and
undesirable, even to the point that many individuals would be
worse off through most of their lives, and enough to offset the
benefits of better health afforded them near the end of life.
Indeed, several people have predicted that retardation of aging
will present a classic instance of the “Tragedy of the
Commons”, in which genuine and sought-for gains to
individuals are nullified, or worse, by the social consequences
of granting them to everyone. (Life, Liberty and the Defense
of Dignity, 2002, at 261)
Clearly, Harris and Kass read the runes in rather
different ways and who can be sure which view is the more
accurate? As Harris himself concedes, “unless we can see
clearly how probable and serious the dangers are and have
a realistic basis for balancing them against the probability
and size of the benefits, we can have no basis for either
precaution or enthusiasm” (at 17).
Dignitarianism
The most conspicuous opposition to utilitarian green-
lightism comes from the dignitarians; and the most
eloquent advocacy against human enhancement comes
from Michael Sandel (The Case Against Perfection, 2007). It is
not enough, as Sandel concedes, to intone that
“enhancement, cloning, and genetic engineering pose a
threat to human dignity” (at 24); while this might be
correct, “the challenge is to say how these practices
diminish our humanity” (ibid). In what sense, then, might
we think that human enhancement compromises the duty
to respect human dignity?
Dignitarians operate with a number of axioms, one of
which is that it is wrong to commodify the human body.
Some might think that human enhancement does involve
commodification; that this compromises human dignity;
and that this is precisely why regulators should intervene.
For example, suppose that humans are equipped with
nano-sensors monitoring their health and with drug
release systems that are activated when problems are
detected. According to Bert Gordijn ((2006) 34 Journal of
Law, Medicine and Ethics 726):
[S]uch developments will contribute to a more technologically
inspired image of the body as something very similar to a
machine. The body will increasingly be regarded as a whole,
made up of many different components that might be fixed,
enhanced or replaced if necessary. Development, functions,
and appearance of the body will seem less and less fixed by
nature and less frequently accepted without change, and more
frequently controllable by technology. Instead of being in
charge of our own health we might increasingly trust
technology to take over this responsibility. In the process
however, the body will be treated almost like the inanimate
material of a machine. Hence, the body might become
increasingly de-hallowed and de-mystified. (at 729)
To the extent that nanomedicine adopts or encourages
the functional view that is already evident in human
genetics and the new brain sciences, this will compound
dignitarian concerns about commodification. The promise
of in vivo nanosensors and drug release systems, like the
promise of regenerative medicine, sounds fine until it is set
alongside the disaggregation of humans into their
component parts. Is there really no distinction between
humans and, say, a motor car or a computer – just so many
parts, so many functions, so many models? 
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More broadly, dignitarians express concern about the
cultural impact of emerging technologies. Famously, for
instance, Francis Fukuyama (Our Posthuman Future, 2002)
has argued that we need to be careful not to undermine the
conditions that allow for the expression of the full gamut
of human emotions. For unenhanced humans, there is no
shortage of pain and suffering, and we are rarely left in any
doubt about our considerable limitations and finitude –
but, as Fukuyama would have it, this is no bad thing; for,
without these features, humans would find no occasion for
sympathy and compassion, courage and heroism, strength
of character, and so on. In a similar vein, we find Bill
McKibben railing against genetic engineering (Enough:
Genetic Engineering and the End of Human Nature, 2003); and
Michael Sandel has argued that, in addition to rejecting the
giftedness of life, enhancement might violate human
dignity by corroding the human sense of humility, solidarity
and responsibility. 
If dignitarianism is to be more than a partisan (and
conservative) dogma, the claim that human enhancement
should be prohibited because it might compromise human
dignity needs further development; and this is a matter to
which I will return.
Human rights
In Bloomsbury, Bentham and the spirit of utilitarianism
still might persist; and, in some parts of Europe,
dignitarian thinking is strongly entrenched. However, for
the most part, the modern legal and political culture in
Europe is that of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Granted, there are some pockets of
dignitarianism in European law – notably in the moral
exclusions against patentability in the EC Directive on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Directive
1998/44/EC); and, from time to time, Strasbourg has to
correct the UK’s tendency to default to pragmatic or
utilitarian positions (most recently in the Marper case).
However, the headline commitment is to human rights.
The most pressing question, therefore, is what regulators
who are committed to respect for human rights should
make of proposals for human enhancement.
I suggest that, in such a community, regulators should
apply two tests. First, regulators should ensure that any
proposed enhancement is compatible with respect for the
recognised array of rights. Secondly, regulators should also
be satisfied that any proposed enhancement is compatible
with the community’s aspiration to operate as a moral
community – in other words, regulators (and, here, there
are echoes of dignitarian concern) need to act as stewards
in relation to the conditions that are conducive to a moral
way of life.
THE FIRST TEST: RIGHTS COMPATIBILITY
Proposals for human enhancement surely will prompt
some familiar debates. For example, it might be argued
that technologies to enhance human eyesight will prove to
be incompatible with privacy rights – it was after all the
development of surveillance technologies that prompted
much of the contemporary concern about privacy; that
(expensive) technologies to enhance human intelligence
will accentuate inequalities and invite unfair
discrimination; and that technologies to enhance the
human embryo, fetus, or neonate might prove to be
inconsistent with autonomy rights – or, as Dena Davis
(Genetic Dilemmas, 2001) has put it, with the right to an
“open future”. 
We might also expect, however, that the community’s
concern for human rights will take the regulatory debates
into areas that, if not entirely uncharted, are at least not
well charted. Let me suggest four such areas.
First, it is trite that emerging technologies are open to
both (benign and beneficial) use and abuse. Regulators
need to decide how they will deal with proposed human
enhancements that are, in this sense, dual use. If there is a
risk that a proposed enhancement technology might be
abused (by being applied in ways that violate human
rights), regulators should certainly leave regulatees in no
doubt that abusive use is prohibited. However, if there is
no guarantee that this would eliminate any risk of abuse
(and regulators would rarely be able to give such
guarantees), should all applications of the technology be
prohibited? Even though this is a drastic measure, if
regulators take a one-dimensional precautionary approach,
they will intervene to prohibit the technology. But, this is
extraordinarily drastic and, as Cass Sunstein (Laws of Fear,
2005) has persuasively argued, it is not rational – or, at any
rate, it is not rational to take such precautionary measures
unless there is no relevant sacrifice involved in giving up the
non-abusive use of the technology. Accordingly, where a
proposal for human enhancement is judged to have a
beneficial and benign application, regulators need to factor
considerations of proportion into their precautionary
reasoning; and this, to put it mildly, introduces some quite
complex calculations.
Second, it is common ground that, where competitive
rules prohibit the use of enhancers, then regulators should
apply the prohibitions. This invites the question: is the
community able to distinguish clearly between competitive
and non-competitive situations? To be sure, it should be
possible to differentiate between those arenas in which
there are explicit rules that govern competition and those
arenas that are not regulated in the same explicit way; but
this does not get to the conceptual distinction between
competitive and non-competitive situations. Let me
suppose, nevertheless, that the community is able to draw
this distinction in a clear and workable way. This then
prompts a third and a fourth debating point.
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Following on from this second point, a third area for
regulatory debate will concern the use of human
enhancement in non-competitive situations. In such
situations, where the proposed enhancement does not in
any way impinge on particular human rights, there is no
problem; but, where there is a possible infringement of
rights, might the community overcome this by adopting
zones for enhanced humans (licensed by consent)? On the
face of it, this seems a possibility. If, say, enhanced eyesight
gives rise to privacy violations, this can be squared where
the affected parties consent. In the same way that parties
consent to a state of undress on a nudist beach, might there
be zones in which, by consent, enhancement (and,
concomitantly, what would otherwise be rights violations)
are permitted? In principle, at any rate, this seems
unobjectionable. In practice, though, it might be a very
different story. Even if we assume (as I have done) that
competitive and non-competitive sectors can be clearly
differentiated, would it be possible in practice to maintain
a clear boundary line between those (non-competitive)
zones in which rights-violating enhancements are treated as
authorised and those where they are not? Moreover, if a
particular enhancement is non-reversible or cannot be
neutralised, does this mean that those who are so enhanced
are to be imprisoned in their zones?
Finally, regulators need to address their approach to the
use of human enhancement in competitive situations.
Might there be some competitions that permit
enhancement? From a human rights perspective, would
there be anything unethical about, say, three classes of
Olympic competition, one for the disabled, a second for
the unenhanced able, and a third for the enhanced? Sandel
wryly remarks that “cheating is not the only way that a
sport can be corrupted” (at 35); and we certainly might
prefer to retain Olympic competition as we now know it.
However, in a community of rights, while citizens may vote
their preferences, regulators should not prohibit human
enhancement that violates no human rights simply because
this is in line with majority preferences. What regulators
need to consider is whether, by permitting enhancement in
competitive contexts (including, say, in university law
schools and professional settings), this not only creates a
pressure to use enhancers but involves a violation of the
rights of those who prefer to act without enhancement.
THE SECOND TEST: CULTURAL
CORROSION
A community that is committed to respect for human
rights is a particular kind of moral community. To this
extent, it is no different to utilitarian or dignitarian
communities. For each of these communities, albeit with
their own distinctive moral criteria, there is an aspiration
to do the right thing. It follows that regulators should
check proposals for human enhancement to be sure that
they properly respect the conditions that allow for the
possibility of a moral way of life. 
In its excellent report, Beyond Therapy (2003), the US
President’s Council on Bioethics – a Council informed by
a dignitarian approach – cautions against the
administration of methylphenidate (Ritalin) and
amphetamine (Adderall) to children whose conduct is
outside the range of acceptability:
Behavior-modifying agents circumvent…[the process of self-
control and progressive moral education], and act directly on
the brain to affect the child’s behavior without the intervening
learning process. If what matters is only the child’s outward
behavior, then this is simply a more effective and efficient
means of achieving the desired result. But because moral
education is typically more about the shaping of the agent’s
character than about the outward act, the process of learning
to behave appropriately matters most of all. If the
development of character depends on effort to choose and act
appropriately, often in the face of resisting desires and
impulses, then the more direct pharmacological approach
bypasses a crucial element….By treating the restlessness of
youth as a medical, rather than a moral, challenge, those
resorting to behavior-modifying drugs might not only deprive
[the] child of an essential part of this education. They might
also encourage him to change his self-understanding as
governed largely by chemical impulses and not by moral
decisions grounded in some sense of what is right and
appropriate. (105-106)
Now, while this is a plea against a certain kind of social
control, we might imagine the same drugs being used by
the healthy and well-adjusted to sharpen their competitive
edge. Or, we might imagine that enhancers can be used to
improve our moral character. Let us suppose that, with the
appropriate enhancing supplement, agents either find it
much easier to empathise and sympathise with others
(their moral will is boosted) or they find it much easier to
do the right thing because the intensity of their immoral
inclinations has been reduced or suppressed. Would this
corrode the essential conditions for moral community?
We might recall Mustapha Mond’s conversation with the
Savage in Huxley’s Brave New World, where Mond points out
that, in place of all the effort associated with hard moral
training, anyone can be moral by swallowing a small
amount of soma. As Mond puts it, “Anybody can be
virtuous now. You can carry at least half your morality
about in a bottle. Christianity without tears – that’s what
soma is.” Back in a community of rights, would such a
regulatory strategy (assuming that it is known that this is
what regulators are doing) be problematic? One thought is
that such an approach might be judged to interfere with
the realisation of authentic, unaided, moral action; yet,
even if we intuitively prefer that moral action is unaided
rather than artificially assisted, it is not at all easy to give a
coherent sense to the idea of authenticity (see, eg, Neil
Levy, Neuroethics, 2007, Chs 2 and 3). 
If, instead of boosting the moral will, regulators target
their strategy at suppressing the inclination to defect, would
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this make any difference? Let us suppose, once again, that
a regime of smart drugs will have the desired effect. On the
face of it, this does not seem to be materially different from
the first approach. If the suppressants are so powerful that
they eliminate all desire to defect, then there might be a
question mark against such an intervention; and, we might
also question this approach if we harbour a sense of moral
virtue that involves a certain degree of overcoming (where
the intervention, if not eliminating the desire to defect,
suppresses it to a level that makes it simply too easy for the
agent to claim any merit in doing the right thing). 
There are many more questions to be asked about the
way in which enhancing technologies impact on the
conditions for moral community (see Roger Brownsword
and Karen Yeung eds, Regulating Technologies, 2008); but the
issues can be expressed even more sharply when we turn
from the prospect of enhanced citizens or enhanced
lawyers to that of enhanced law-enforcers.
ENHANCED LAW-ENFORCERS
If regulators were able to enhance their enforcement
apparatus and their agents so that either (a) they have
comprehensive powers of detection (all crimes and
offenders are unfailingly detected) or (b) they can (and do)
actually prevent the commission of crime (there are no
violations), we would seem to have the perfect solution.
Or, would we? While such an enhanced regime of law
enforcement would tick all the boxes for regulatory
effectiveness, would it pass muster relative to the tests of
regulatory legitimacy? Even if we assume that the
substantive criminal code that is so enforced is judged to be
legitimate, would the way in which the code is enforced
satisfy the legitimacy test? This is a question that takes us
back to the basic conditions for moral community.
Enhancement qua perfect detection
Imagine a panopticon regulatory apparatus, a super
surveillance society, including enhanced enforcement
agents. Every violation will be detected; every offender will
be corrected; and every citizen knows that this is the case.
Provided that the code is human rights compliant in its
substantive provisions, what objection might there be?
The problem with such a regulatory regime is that
agents in a community of rights expect to make a choice
between compliance and non-compliance with their legal-
moral criminal code. To be sure, panopticon observation
presents agents with the paper option of non-compliance,
but the reality is that agents who do not obey most
certainly will pay. Echoing the concerns of the chaplain in
Anthony Burgess’ novel, A Clockwork Orange, this state of
affairs might be thought to interfere with the development
of agent virtue, particularly the virtue of choosing to do the
right thing for the right reason. For, if agents comply only
because they fear certain detection and punishment, there
is little room for the promotion of the desired virtue.
Let me put this in a slightly different way. In traditional
regulatory environments, the coding is normative;
regulatees are directed that they ought to act in certain
ways. The reasons supporting such normative signals are
either moral (one ought to act in the particular way
because this is categorically the right thing to do) or
prudential (one ought to act in a particular way because
this is in one’s self-interest). For a community with moral
aspirations, it is important that the signals in the regulatory
environment appeal to moral reason. Hence, the problem
(for an aspirant moral community) with enhanced
detection is that the overriding reason backing the
regulatory signals becomes that of self-interest.
Enhancement qua perfect prevention
Imagine that the enhancement of enforcement agents is
even more formidable; they are able in a wholly reliable
and accurate fashion to exclude or preclude the possibility
of crime. There are a number of objections to such a
regime.
First, if such exclusionary enhancement operates in a
way that regulatees do not appreciate that they are being
channelled away from what would otherwise be the
commission of crime, then there are problems about the
transparency of the regulatory regime. 
Second, there is, so to speak, the abandonment of the
normative. If perfect detection entails a shift from the
moral ought to the prudential ought, perfect preclusion
entails a shift from what ought to be done to what can (or
cannot) be done. With panopticon enhancement, there is
no real chance of doing the right thing for the right reason;
with exclusionary enhancement, there is literally no chance
of doing anything other than the right thing (as determined
by the regulators). It is true that exclusionary
enhancement might leave some space for private moral
decision-making; and the possible significance of leaving
such space merits further consideration. However, by
excluding the most public of moral matters, exclusionary
enhancement yields only an ersatz community of rights.
Third, there is also the precautionary thought that, even
if today’s regulators and their enhanced enforcement
agents are committed to the right moral script, there is no
guarantee that this will always be the case. Just as regulatees
might abuse their enhanced powers, so too might
regulators.
CONCLUSION
Proposals for human enhancement are on the near
horizon. How should regulators respond? My overall
conclusion is that, while there are some poor arguments
against human enhancement, we need to go further than
asking whether the ostensibly enhancing technological
feature improves a particular human capacity – or, at any
rate, this further inquiry is essential in a community of
rights.
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In such a community, two key questions need to be
asked. One is whether the existence and exercise of the
enhanced capacity is compatible with agents’ rights; and
the other is whether the enhancement is compatible with
the conditions that are essential for a prospering moral
community. Each proposed enhancement would need to
be assessed against these criteria. Only if a proposal satisfies
each limb of the test should it be given regulatory
clearance.
Recently, John Harris has joined others in arguing for a
responsible approach to the development and use of
technologies of human enhancement ((2008) Nature
(December 7) 702). In a community of rights, no one
would dissent from this proposition. However, the focus of
that responsibility would be on the community’s
substantive commitment to rights and its underlying
commitment to a moral way of life. In such a community,
while the presence of a Society of Advanced Legal Scholars
would seem to be an unqualified good, we might need to
think twice before we inaugurated a Society of Enhanced
Legal Scholars.
Coda
At the end of the talk on which this article is based, the
Chair, Professor Avrom Sherr, remarked that the discussion
evoked recollections of Seven of Nine. Not being a Trekkie,
I was at a loss to respond. However, thanks to the wonder
that is Wikipedia, I now know that this character, having
been born human, was assimilated by the Borg (which I can
now say in a knowing kind of way) before having the
majority of her cybernetic implants removed, and thereby
reasserting her humanity. Speaking of Seven of Nine’s
personality, Wikipedia, having reported that she shows
“paradoxical displays of arrogance, warmth, passion, wit,
and vulnerability”, then adds that “[s]he is largely incapable
of perceiving ‘shades of gray’ – something is strictly one way
or entirely another.” And just when I was beginning to think
that this was the perfect cv for a prospective member of the
Society of Enhanced Legal Scholars.
Roger Brownsword
Professor of Law and Director of TELOS, King’s College London, and
Honorary Professor in Law at the University of Sheffield
Library News
LIBRARY WINS HALSBURY AWARD
For the second year in a row, the IALS Library has received
an award for excellence at the annual conference of the
British and Irish Association of Law Librarians (BIALL).
The IALS Library was presented with the award for Best
Legal Information Service (non-commercial) on June 18 at
the conference in Manchester. The award was received on
behalf of the IALS by Jules Winterton, Laura Griffiths and
Hester Swift.
Jules Winterton, Associate Director and Librarian of the
IALS, said: “The IALS Library is honoured to have received
such a prestigious award which is a tribute to the special
expertise and hard work of the library staff.” Halsbury’s
Awards “recognise, celebrate and reward the dedicated
performance and outstanding service given by legal
information services, law libraries and those teams
managing legal collections and resources.”
